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The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of the congestion pricing scheme at Namsan #1 and #3 tunnels in downtown Seoul
four years after its implementation. The effectiveness of the scheme was measured by the changes of various traffic impacts. The traffic volume of
the two tunnels was reduced by up to 25% for the first month. After that time, the traffic volume started to increase again and then exceeded the
previous volume level. However, average travel speed of the two tunnel corridors improved by up to 74%. The overall traffic volume of the four alter-
native routes was increased; nevertheless, their average travel speed increased as well. The number of carpool vehicles occupied by 3 or more
persons including the driver during the peak periods was remarkably increased. Before the congestion fee charging, toll-charged vehicles amounted
to 68.5% of the total traffic volume of the two tunnels, and then the share dropped to 29% afterwards. The empirical analysis results for the effective-
ness of the congestion pricing scheme are very promising.
Key Words: TDM, Congestion, Pricing, Effectiveness, Seoul
1.  INTRODUCTION
Seoul has earned a notorious reputation for its se-
vere traffic congestion. In order to mitigate the conges-
tion problem, the transportation policy of Seoul
Metropolitan Government (SMG) had been mainly fo-
cused on the supply of transportation systems such as
constructing new urban freeways and subway lines until
the early 1990’s. However, after 1993, the SMG has ap-
proached traffic problems from a different angle in re-
sponse to the limitation of the past transportation policy
to solve the traffic congestion problem. The new approach
is to manage the demand of transportation systems by
implementing a congestion pricing scheme.
Congestion pricing is generally considered to be the
most effective method to control vehicle usage, as well
as to reflect time-space variations of traffic congestion
among many transportation demand management (TDM)
techniques. However, the scheme was not a popular al-
ternative. Very few cities adopted congestion pricing, al-
though it was considered for implementation by many
major cities around the world. Singapore, for example, ex-
perienced a sizable success in relieving traffic congestion
by using the Area License Scheme (ALS) in the CBD.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the congestion pricing scheme at the Namsan
#1 and #3 tunnels in downtown Seoul four years after its
implementation. The SMG will decide on the expansion
of tolled congestion sites based on the effects of the
scheme’s implementation. The paper consists of five parts
including: 1) background of implementing congestion
pricing scheme in Seoul, 2) contents of the scheme, 3)
framework of analysis and research method, 4) analysis
results, and 5) summary and conclusion. Effectiveness
was measured by changes in the following four part: 1)
trip reduction impacts, 2) time shift impacts, 3) route
change impacts, and 4) mode shift impacts.
2.  BACKGROUND OF IMPLEMENTING
CONGESTION PRICING IN SEOUL
The current roadway network in Seoul is insuffi-
cient to sustain massive amounts of traffic volume. The
paved road ratio in Seoul is only 20.8%, which is some-
what lower than those of major cities in other countries.
In 1996, the total length of urban freeways was about
200km out of 7,689km of total paved roads in Seoul.
Figure 1 shows the arterial roads in Seoul. Most ar-
terial roads in Seoul are heavily congested throughout the
day. It is, however, financially not feasible to build new
roadways to an extent that will mitigate the traffic con-
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gestion in Seoul because of insufficient land supply and
high land prices. It is noteworthy that about 35% of the
CBD (the center of the map below) workers use private
vehicles for commuting, and that other workers use pub-
lic transit due to either traffic congestion or shortage of
parking spaces1. This implies that there are plenty of pri-
vate vehicles waiting to be driven when the traffic con-
ditions are improved. In light of this fact, it is hopeless
to expect that the traffic congestion can be relieved by
road construction alone.
Fig. 1  Arterial roads in Seoul
Table 1 summarizes the changes of the number of
registered vehicles in Seoul and suburban areas. The num-
ber of registered vehicles in Seoul increased 12.3% dur-
ing the time period from November 1996 to November
2000, while that of suburban areas increased 34.7%. It
should be noted that about 25% of the total vehicles mak-
ing their daily trips to Seoul are registered in the subur-
ban areas and the number of long distance commuters
travelling from the suburban areas has been increasing
steadily.
Table 2 summarizes some important results for the
share of travel modes in Seoul, which was obtained from
the O-D survey conducted by the Seoul Development In-
stitute in 1996. In the case of subway trips, a transfer
among different subway lines was counted as an indepen-
dent trip. Buses have been the prevailing travel mode in
Seoul, however the subway has carried 30.8% of all the
daily trips in 1997 and then it became, temporarily for
the first time, the most predominant travel mode. In the
table, it can be seen that the share of bus trips was de-
creased remarkably from 1980 to 1997 due to fast grow-
ing subway supply. However, the share of private vehicles
was sharply increased from 1996 and has been stabilized
at around 20%. It seems that the bus ridership is some-
what sensitive to the implementation of the subway net-
work, but the share of private vehicles is not highly
dependent upon the level of subway service.
Traffic conditions in Seoul were without serious
congestion up to the early 1980s, except during rush hour
periods, but the traffic patterns changed from rush-hour
peaks only to all-day peaks by the end of the 1980s. Table
3 shows the changes of average travel speed on the ma-
jor arterial roads in Seoul from the year 1990 to 2000.
Table 1  Change of the number of registered vehicles in Seoul Metropolitan Area (unit: vehicles)
Classification Nov. 1996 Nov. 1999 Nov. 2000 Variation against 1996 Variation against 1999
Seoul Metropolitan 2,168,182 2,297,726 2,435,253 12.3%   6.0%
Kyonggi-Do 1,809,624 2,245,744 2,469,617 36.6% 10.0%
In-chon 503,645 593,380 645,505 28.2%   8.8%
Total 4,481,451 5,136,850 5,550,375 23.9%   8.1%
Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2000a2
Table 2   Share of travel mode for the daily trips in Seoul (unit: %)
Classification 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Bus 66.0 58.0 43.3 36.7 30.1 29.5 32.3 33.8 35.3
Subway   7.0 14.0 18.8 29.8 29.4 30.8 29.1 28.8 28.3
Taxi 19.0 16.5 12.8 10.7 10.4 10.1   9.7    9.2   8.8
Others   8.0 12.5 25.1 22.8 30.1 29.7 28.9 28.2 27.6
(Passenger cars) (NA) (NA) (14.0) (14.5) (21.1) (20.6) (20.1) (19.6) (19.1)
Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2000a2
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The overall average travel speed on the major arterial
roads continued to decline until 1996 and started to
bounce back from 1997, but decreased again in 2000. The
reasons for the speed changes between 1997 and 2000
will be explained later.
3.  CONTENTS OF CONGESTION PRICING
SCHEME IN SEOUL
The Seoul Metropolitan Government started charg-
ing, from November 11 in 1996, 2,000 won (US $1.5 -
1.6) congestion toll for one and two persons (including
driver) occupied private vehicles passing through the
Namsan #1 and #3 tunnels. The two tunnel corridors link
the southern part of the Han river and the old downtown
area. The two tunnel corridors were notorious for exces-
sive private vehicle use. In 1996, 90% of total traffic vol-
ume passing the two tunnels consisted of the private
vehicles, this number was the highest among all the ma-
jor corridors linked to the CBD. Furthermore, 78% of the
private vehicles were one person occupied. Toll booth fa-
cilities for cash collection exist at the two tunnels, where
100 won tolls were collected from all the vehicles pass-
ing through the tunnels for 20 years until October 1996
to recover the construction costs. Prior to the implemen-
tation of the congestion toll, a seven-day public notice
was given4.
The toll charges are collected for vehicles travel-
ling in both directions per entry from 7 a.m. to 9 p.m.
during weekdays and from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. on Saturdays.
Sundays and national holidays are free of charge. The vio-
lation penalty amounts to 10,000 won (five times the con-
gestion fee). The following vehicles are exempted from
the charge: three or more persons occupying private ve-
hicles, all buses, vans, trucks, diplomats’ vehicles, report-
ers’ vehicles, government vehicles, and ceremony
vehicles5.
4.  ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK
The main purpose of congestion pricing is to relieve
traffic congestion by reducing traffic volume on over-
loaded roadways. Congestion pricing plays the role of re-
ducing social costs by switching the condition of the
roadway network equilibrium from user-optimum to sys-
tem-optimum. In theory (see the left hand side of Figure
2), where the demand curve D meets the marginal cost
curve M1 in the forward bending section, it should be
verified that traffic volumes decrease from Fe to Fs, while
traffic speed improves on the corridor where the charge
is levied. Where the demand curve crosses with the mar-
ginal cost curve in the backward bending section (see the
right hand side of Figure 2), it can be expected that the
traffic volume increases from Fe to Fs and speed increases
below C26.
In general, congestion tolls are imposed when con-
gestion occurs. Accordingly, tolls are collected only dur-
ing a certain time period, and vehicles tend to concentrate
on the time period just before and after the congestion
charging periods to escape the toll. It is desirable if traf-
fic volumes during the morning and evening peak peri-
ods decrease due to such a time shift impact. However,
if too many drivers change their trip schedule, network-






















Fig. 2  Theory of congestion pricing
Table 3  Changes of average travel speed on the major arterial roads in Seoul  (unit: km/h)
Classification 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Passenger car All 24.2 24.6 22.6 23.5 23.2 21.7 20.1 21.1 25.4 25.4 22.9
CBD 16.4 17.7 19.3 20.0 20.0 18.3 16.4 16.9 17.7 21.2 18.5
Other 25.8 21.9 22.9 23.8 23.4 21.9 21.2 21.3 25.9 25.7 23.2
Bus 18.8 18.2 16.9 17.0 18.4 18.8 18.4 18.4 20.1 19.2 19.0
Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2000b3
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There are several alternative routes for the Namsan
#1 and #3 tunnels, so implementing congestion pricing at
the two tunnels may worsen traffic situations of alternative
routes. In such a case, congestion pricing only plays the role
of shifting the congestion without improving overall traf-
fic conditions of the roadway network. Therefore, in order
to validate the effectiveness of the congestion pricing
scheme at the two tunnels, it is necessary to assess changes
in the traffic situation of the alternative routes.
It can be expected that the majority of private ve-
hicle drivers who want to escape the congestion charge
may choose alternative travel modes instead of giving up
their auto travel altogether. Currently, eight subway lines
are in operation, and about 9,000 buses serve about 430
routes. Carpools and taxis may be options to use as well.
Considering the effects of the congestion pricing
scheme at the Namsan #1 and #3 tunnels, the effective-
ness of the scheme will be determined as a result of the
changes in the following four parts7:
1) Trip reduction impacts: traffic volume and speed of the
Namsan #1 and #3 tunnel corridors and the composi-
tion of vehicle flows passing through the two tunnels;
2) Time shift impacts: traffic volume just before and af-
ter congestion toll charging period at the two tunnels;
3) Route change impacts: traffic volume and speed of the
alternative routes;
4) Mode shift impacts: the number of toll free vehicles
and the number of passengers using the alternative
travel modes.
5.  SOME IMPORTANT EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1 Trip reduction impacts on Namsan #1 and #3
tunnels
5.1.1 Impacts of congestion pricing
It has been four years since the congestion pricing
scheme were implemented at the Namsan #1 and #3 tun-
nels in November 1996. Table 4 shows the results for traf-
fic volume and speed changes on the two tunnel corri-
dors. Before the implementation, more than 90,000
vehicles passed through the two tunnels during the time
period from 7 a.m. to 9 p.m. The traffic volume of the
two tunnels was reduced by up to 25% for the first month
in 1996. After that time, the traffic volume started to in-
crease again and then exceeded 94,000 vehicles in the
year 2000. The majority of the traffic volume increase
consisted of the toll free vehicles such as taxies, trucks,
and three or more persons occupying private vehicles.
This is explained in Section 5.4.
Although the traffic volume was recovered to the
previous level, the average travel speed of the two tun-
nel corridors has been steadily improved and maintained
at over 30km/h with the exception of the year 1997. The
speed was 21.6km/h previously, but it was 37.6km/h in
the year 2000. Comparing the changes on traffic volume
with those of speed, it can be said that the congestion pric-
ing scheme at the Namsan tunnels has contributed not
only to improve the traffic condition of the two tunnel
corridors in terms of the level of congestion, but also to
reduce one and two person occupied private vehicles. It
is noteworthy that 93% of drivers passing through the
Namsan #1 and #3 tunnels have responded in the survey
that they chose the tunnel corridors because the corridors
maintained relatively higher speeds than the other corri-
dors8.
5.1.2 The combined impacts of congestion pricing and
oil price increase
Table 5 shows the traffic volume variations at the
Namsan #1 and #3 tunnels by the change of gasoline price
during the period from November 1996 to December
1998. In Korea, gasoline price had been fluctuated fre-
quently since November 1997 due to the foreign currency
crisis and oil tax increase. The total number of vehicles
at the two tunnels decreased as the gasoline price in-
creased during the period between November 1997 and
January 1998. After that, the traffic volume has been kept
Table 4 Traffic volume and speed changes on Namsan #1 and #3 tunnel corridors during the time period from 7
a.m. to 9 p.m.
Classification Nov. 1996 (before) Nov. 1996 (after) Nov. 1997 Nov. 1998 Nov. 1999 Nov. 2000
Traffic volume 90,404 67,912 78,078 80,784 87,886 94,494(vehicles) (−24.9%) (−13.6%) (−10.6%) (−2.8%) (+4.5%)
Speed (km/h) 21.6 33.6 29.8 31.9 30.6 37.6(+55.9%) (+38.1%) (+47.7%) (+42.0%) (+74.0%)
Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2000a2
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increasing, notwithstanding the increase of gasoline
prices. This variation of total travel volume is similar to
that of toll free traffic volume. However, the number of
toll charged vehicles has steadily increased during the
same time periods. It seems that the impact of gasoline
price is not sustainable for the private vehicle drivers.
5.1.3 The impacts of temporary suspension of conges-
tion pricing
In early August 1998, heavy rainfalls flooded the
major arterial roads in Seoul and many of them were shut
down for a few days. Due to this, the congestion toll
charging at the two tunnels was suspended for 8 days until
the arterial roads were completely restored. Table 6 sum-
marizes the results for traffic volume changes at the tun-
nels during the same time period. Traffic volume of the
Namsan #1 tunnel increased very quickly and, on the first
day of the suspension, exceeded the traffic volume ob-
served in November 1996 when the congestion pricing
scheme was not implemented at the tunnel. However,
traffic volume of the Namsan #3 tunnel increased very
slowly and has not reached the previous volume level,
50,422 vehicles.
There is a possible reason for the difference of traf-
fic patterns at the two tunnels. The Namsan #3 tunnel is
connected with Banpo Bridge and Jamsu Bridge which
lies underneath the Banpo Bridge. During heavy rainfalls,
the Jamsu Bridge became submerged, so the bridge was
entirely shut down during the period. Thus, the traffic
volume travelling through the Namsan #3 tunnel corri-
dor was much less than the traffic volume observed be-
fore the implementation of the congestion pricing scheme.
In summary, the traffic volumes at the two tunnels
will gradually increase if the congestion pricing scheme
is not implemented. This finding supports the argument
that congestion pricing plays a key role in reducing traf-
fic volume in a congested area.
5.2 Time shift impacts
Table 7 shows the results for traffic volume changes
just before and after the toll charging periods. In the table,
before the congestion pricing scheme was implemented
in 1996, the traffic volume during the time period from
6 a.m. to 7 a.m. was 5,159 vehicles, and the traffic vol-
ume during the time period from 9 p.m. to 10 p.m. was
5,369 vehicles. After the implementation of congestion
pricing, the traffic volumes during the same time peri-
ods were remarkably increased, especially during the
evening time period. This result was clearly caused by
the drivers’ travel time-shifting behavior. As expected,
drivers changed their departure time in order to escape
the toll charging, but the drivers’ travel patterns during
Table 6 Traffic volume changes during the time period from 7 a.m. to 9 p.m. after the temporary suspension of
toll charging in August 1998 (unit: vehicles)
Classification Before Congestion Pricing August 6th August 7th August 10th August 11th August 12th August 13th
Namsan 39,982 40,547 40,303 40,467 43,917 44,002 43,324#1 tunnel (1.4%) (0.8%) (1.2%) (9.8%) (10.1%) (8.4%)
Namsan 50,422 34,818 37,881 37,995 39,678 39,964 43,192#3 tunnel (−30.9%) (−24.9%) (−24.6%) (−21.3%) (−20.7%) (−14.3%)
Total 90,404 75,365 77,684 78,462 83,595 83,966 86,516(−16.6%) (−14.1%) (−13.2%) (−7.5%) (−7.1%) (−4.3%)
Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government, 19989
Table 5  Traffic volume and gasoline price changes
Date Nov. 1996 Nov. 1997 Jan. 1998 Feb. 1998 May 1998 Sep. 1998
Gasoline Price (won per liter) 638 839 1,143 1,190 1,041 1,224
Namsan Total traffic volume 90,404 78,078 74,017 75,592 78,220 80,630#1 and #3 during toll charged (−13.6%) (−18.1%) (−16.4%) (−13.5%) (−10.8%)tunnels time period
Toll-charged 23,526 47,482 49,941 51,912 52,619 54,396
vehicle volume (101.8%) (112.2%) (120.7%) (123.7%) (131.2%)
Toll-free vehicle 66,878 30,596 24,076 23,680 25,601 26,234
volume (−54.3%) (−64.0%) (−64.6%) (−61.7%) (−60.8%)
Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government, 19989
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the two time periods are somewhat different. In detail,
the traffic volume change during the evening time period
is much bigger than during the morning time period with
the exception of June 1997. The traffic volume during the
morning time period has been gradually decreased, while
during the evening time period steadily increased. These
results have something to do with the fact that office
hours in Korea are very flexible while the opening hours
are very strict, so drivers are less sensitive to the toll
charging during the morning time period than during the
evening time period.
5.3 Route change impacts
In order to investigate the traffic effects of the con-
gestion pricing scheme on the alternative routes, four al-
ternative routes which are close to the Namsan #1 and
#3 tunnels and linked to the CBD were selected. These are
Hangang-ro, Sowol-kil, Jangchongdan-kil, and Namsan
#2 tunnel (see Figure 3). For the traffic volume survey,
only private passenger vehicles were counted, since other
types of vehicles would hardly change their routes to es-
cape tolls. The survey period was from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m.
It was expected that the alternative routes would be
severely congested by vehicles which would change their
travel routes to escape the congestion toll. The expecta-
tion was correct, but included an interesting result. That
is, while the traffic volumes on the alternative routes in-
creased during the first two years, the average travel
speeds increased as well (see Table 8). There are possible
reasons for the traffic volume increase and the speed im-
provement.
First, the Namsan #2 tunnel was entirely closed
from the year 1999 for repair work, so total traffic vol-
ume of the alternative routes was decreased. Secondly,
overall traffic conditions on urban corridors are highly de-
pendent on the level of congestion at major signalized in-
tersections on the corridors. After the congestion pricing
scheme was implemented, traffic volumes of all ap-
proaches at the signalized intersection were uniformly
distributed. In other words, traffic volume approaching
from the tunnels to the signalized intersection was re-
duced, while traffic volume approaching from the alter-
native routes to the signalized intersection increased. Con-
sequently, the traffic queues forming at the major signal-
ized intersections linked to the Namsan tunnel corridors
were significantly reduced. This change improved traf-
fic signal operation in terms of signal cycle time and sig-
nal phases, so the stopped delay at the signalized
intersections was remarkably reduced.
Fig. 3 Roadway network near Namsan #1 and #3 tunnels
5.4 Mode shift impacts
Table 9 shows the changes of toll-charged vehicles
and toll-free vehicles. Before the congestion fee charg-
ing, toll-charged vehicles amounted to 68.5% of the to-
tal traffic volume of the two tunnels. However, the
vehicles drastically decreased and then reached only 29%
at both tunnels.
Table 10 summarizes the results for traffic volume
composition by vehicle type. The traffic volume was ob-
tained during the time periods from 7 a.m. to 9 a.m. and
from 5 p.m. to 9 p.m. in November 2000 at the two tun-
nels. As expected, the ratio of passenger cars was de-
creased and the ratios of other vehicles increased; taxies
and trucks increased over twice than the previous levels.
Table 11 presents a comparison of traffic volume
compositions of the two tunnels and the alternative routes.
While the ratio of passenger cars of the two tunnels was
Table 7  Traffic volume changes just before and after toll charging periods (unit: vehicles)
Classification Nov. 1996 (before) Nov. 1996 (after) June 1997 Nov. 1997 June 1998 Nov. 1998
Just before (6 a.m.–7 a.m.) 5,159 5,773 6,411 6,472 6,010 5,812(+11.9%) (+24.2%) (+22.5%) (+16.5%) (+12.7%)
Just after (9 p.m.–10 p.m.) 5,369 7,136 6,525 6,581 7,032 7,806(+32.9%) (+21.5%) (+22.6%) (+31.0%) (+45.4%)
Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government, 19989
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decreased below 50%, that of the alternative routes was
maintained at over 67%. This result clearly indicates that
some of the toll-charged vehicles have changed their
travel route after the congestion fee charging.
Table 12 summarizes the number of passengers car-
ried by buses passing through the two tunnels during the
time periods from 7 a.m. to 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. to 7 p.m.
The number of bus passengers increased over 75%. Cur-
rently, four bus lines are in operation at the Namsan #1
tunnel and eleven bus lines at the Namsan #3 tunnel. At
the Namsan #1 tunnel, one bus line was increased after
the congestion pricing scheme was implemented.
It can be seen from Table 13 that carpool vehicles
occupied by three or more passengers (including the
driver) increased, while the vehicles occupied by one or
two passengers (including the driver) decreased. It seems
Table 8 Traffic volume and speed changes on the alternative routes for 8 hours between 7 a.m. and 9 p.m.
(7:00 - 9:00, 13:00 - 15:00, and 17:00 - 21:00)
Classification Nov. 1996 (before) Nov. 1996 (after) Nov. 1997 Nov. 1998 Nov. 1999 Nov. 2000
Traffic volume (vehicles) 11,721 12,538 12,008 12,862 11,303 11,108(+ 7.0%) (+ 2.4%) (+ 9.7%) (−3.6%) (−5.2%)
Speed (km/h) 24.5 27.4 30.0 27.6 28.9 31.6(+11.7%) (+22.4%) (+12.7%) (+18.0%) (+28.8%)
Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2000a2
Table 9 Traffic volume changes of toll charged vehicles and toll-free vehicles during the time periods from 7 a.m. to
9 a.m. and 5 p.m. to 9 p.m. (unit: vehicles)
Classification Nov. 1996 (before) Nov. 1996 (after) Nov. 1997 Nov. 1998 Nov. 1999 Nov. 2000
Toll-charged 14,308   7,041   7,517   7,356   7,222   7,371
Namsan (71.2%) (43.6%) (40.9%) (33.8%) (30.6%) (29.2%)
# 1 tunnel
Toll-free   5,785   9,112 10,873 14,383 16,374 17,908(28.8%) (56.4%) (59.1%) (66.2%) (69.4%) (70.8%)
Toll-charged 15,050   9,219   9,447   7,335   7,585   7,999
Namsan (66.1%) (43.5%) (39.3%) (32.5%) (30.0%) (29.3%)
# 3 tunnel
Toll-free   7,726 11,812 14,618 15,230 17,738 19,321(33.9%) (56.2%) (60.7%) (67.5%) (70.0%) (70.7%)
Toll-charged 29,358 16,260 16,964 14,691 14,807 15,370
Total (68.5%) (43.7%) (40.0%) (33.2%) (30.3%) (29.2%)
Toll-free 13,511 20,924 25,491 29,613 34,112 37,229(31.5%) (56.3%) (60.0%) (66.8%) (69.7%) (70.8%)
Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2000a2
Table 10 Traffic volume composition by vehicle type passing the Namsan tunnels during the time periods from 7 a.m.
to 9 a.m. and from 5 p.m. to 9 p.m. in November 2000 (unit: vehicles)
Classification Nov. 1996 (before) Dec. 1996 (after) Nov. 1997 Nov. 1998 Nov. 1999 Nov. 2000
Car 18,628 11,874 13,068 12,260 11,949 12,978(78.4%) (63.6%) (59.5%) (52.9%) (47.8%) (48.7%)
Bus      792      825   1,148   1,285   1,592 1,545(3.3%) (4.4%) (5.2%) (5.5%) (6.4%) (5.8%)
Taxi   1,848   2,938   4,178   5,759   6,689   6,957(7.8%) (15.7%) (19.0%) (24.8%) (26.7%) (26.1%)
Truck, etc.   2,484   3,045   3,564   3,901   4,787   5,186(10.5%) (16.3%) (16.3%) (16.8%) (19.1%) (19.4%)
Total 23,752 18,682 21,958 23,205 25,017 26,666(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2000a2
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Table 11 Traffic volume composition by vehicle type at Namsan tunnels and the alternative routes during the time
periods from 7 a.m. to 9 a.m. and from 5 p.m. to 9 p.m. in November 2000 (unit: vehicles)
Classification
Namsan #1 & #3 Tunnels Alternative Routes
Namsan #1 Namsan #3 Sowol-kil Jangchoong dan-kil Hangang-ro
Car 6,204   6,774   9,749   9,010 11,883(48.3%) (49.0%) (75.4%) (70.1%) (67.0%)
Bus 786      760      249      204   1,266(6.1%) (5.5%) (1.9%) (1.6%) (7.1%)
Taxi 3,076   3,880   1,418   1,466   2,224(24.0%) (28.0%) (11.0%) (11.4%) (12.5%)
Truck, etc. 2,769   2,417   1,514   2,164   2,377(21.6%) (17.5%) (11.7%) (16.9%) (13.4%)
Total 12,835 13,831 12,930 12,844 17,750(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2000a2
Table 12 The number of passengers carried by buses passing through the two tunnels during the time periods
from 7 a.m. to 9 a.m. and from 5 p.m. to 7 p.m. (unit: persons)
Classification Nov. 1996 (before) Nov. 1997 Nov. 1998 Nov. 1999 Nov. 2000
Namsan #1 tunnel   4,005   6,057   8,240   9,577   9,307(+51.2%) (+105.7%) (+139.1%) (+132.4%)
Namsan #3 tunnel   7,126   9,089 11,297 10,658 10,259(+27.5%) (+58.5%) (+49.6%) (+44.0%)
Total 11,131 15,146 19,537 20,235 19,566(+36.1%) (+75.5%) (+81.8%) (+75.8%)
Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2000a2
Table 13 Changes of the number of passenger cars passing the Namsan tunnels during the time periods from 7
a.m. to 9 a.m. and from 5 p.m. to 7 p.m. (unit: vehicles)
Classification Nov. 1996 (before) Nov. 1996 (after) Nov. 1997 Nov. 1998 Nov. 1999 Nov. 2000
≤ 2 17,571   9,082 10,470   9,671   9,798 11,138(94.3%) (76.5%) (80.1%) (78.9%) (82.0%) (85.8%)
≥ 3   1,057   2,792   2,598   2,589   2,151   1,840(5.7%) (23.5%) (19.9%) (21.1%) (18.0%) (14.2%)
Total 18,628 11,874 13,068 12,260 11,949 12,978(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2000a2
that the congestion pricing scheme has played a positive
role to change the number of passengers of private ve-
hicles10.
6. CONCLUSION
The effectiveness of the congestion pricing scheme
implemented at Namsan #1 and #3 tunnels in Seoul was
measured by the changes of various traffic impacts. The
traffic volume of the two tunnels was reduced up to 25%
for the first month. After that time, the traffic volume
started to increase again and then exceeded the previous
volume level. However, average travel speed of the two
tunnel corridors was improved by up to 74%. The aver-
age travel speed of four alternative routes was increased,
while the overall traffic volume of the routes increased
as well. The number of carpool vehicles occupied by 3
or more persons (including the driver) during the peak
ROAD PRICING
36  IATSS RESEARCH Vol.26 No.1, 2002
periods was increased remarkably. The toll-charged ve-
hicles, before congestion fee charging, amounted to
68.5% of the total traffic volume of the two tunnels. How-
ever, the number drastically decreased and then reached
only 29% at both tunnels. The overall empirical analysis
results are very promising, so the Seoul Metropolitan
Government has a plan to extend the scheme to other
major congested arterial roads in Seoul.
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